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Mr. Kell appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment on his post-
conviction petition, in which he alleged that the trial judge gave jurors a supplemental 
instruction during their penalty phase deliberations, outside the presence of Mr. Kell or his 
counsel, which unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to Mr. Kell to prove that his 
life should be spared. This claim could have been raised in Mr. Kell’s initial post-
conviction proceedings, but was not, due to ineffective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel. At the time of his initial post-conviction proceedings, Mr. Kell had a substantive 
right to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, see Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 
UT 81, however Mr. Kell’s post-conviction counsel conducted almost no investigation, 
including failing to interview even a single juror, and filed a petition which the federal 
district court in this case called “perfunctory.” (Mem. Decision and Order, Kell v. Benzon, 
No. 2:07-CV-359-CW (D. Utah, Nov. 16, 2017), ECF No. 258 at 5.) 
 The district court agreed that Mr. Kell had a right to the effective assistance of 
counsel in his initial post-conviction proceedings, (PCR II ROA at 909),1 but, by granting 
                                                 
1 Mr. Kell will refer to several different dockets in this brief, as well as transcripts from 
prior state court proceedings. Filings from state trial court proceedings are referenced as 
“ROA” followed by the paginated number prepared by the trial court for Mr. Kell’s direct 
appeal (e.g. ROA 646.) Transcripts from the state court trial will be referred to as “Tr. 
(date) at (page(s)),” followed by a description of the proceeding if needed to distinguish 
proceedings. Filings from Mr. Kell’s initial state post-conviction proceedings will be 
referred to as “PCR ROA” followed by the paginated number from that record. References 
to the record on appeal in the current proceedings will be designated as “PCR II ROA” 
followed by a page number.  
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summary judgment and dismissing his petition, left him without a mechanism to enforce 
that right. This Court should find that the default of Mr. Kell’s claim is excused as a result 
of the ineffective assistance of his post-conviction counsel, in violation of his substantive 
rights. In the alternative, the Court should recognize and apply the egregious injustice 
exception contemplated in Winward v. State, 2012 UT 85.  
 Mr. Kell was tried for capital murder inside in the confines of the prison where the 
crime for which he was on trial occurred. While the jury deliberated just yards away from 
the scene of the crime, the trial judge came into the jury room and, without the presence of 
Mr. Kell or his lawyers, contradicted his prior instructions, telling jurors that it was Mr. 
Kell who bore the burden of establishing that his life should be spared. Neither the jury’s 
question nor the judge’s instruction were entered into the record. Because Mr. Kell’s post-
conviction counsel failed to conduct a reasonable investigation of Mr. Kell’s case, in 
violation of Mr. Kell’s statutory rights, this claim was defaulted. As a result, unless this 
Court recognizes an avenue for Mr. Kell to excuse the default, the most likely outcome is 
that no court will ever address this significant constitutional violation on the merits.  
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Whether Mr. Kell’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated 
when the trial judge gave jurors a supplemental instruction during penalty 
phase deliberations, outside the presence of Mr. Kell or his counsel, that 
shifted the burden of proof to Mr. Kell  
Mr. Kell raised this claim in his Petition and Memorandum in Support. (PCR II 
ROA 24-29.) The Court reviews the denial of post-conviction relief for correctness, with 
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“no deference to the district court’s legal conclusions.” State v. Poole, 2010 UT 25, ¶ 8; 
see also Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT 72, ¶ 7 (“Generally, an appeal from a judgment on 
a petition for post-conviction relief raises questions of law reviewed for correctness, giving 
no deference to the post-conviction court’s conclusion.”).  
II. Whether Mr. Kell’s right to the effective assistance of counsel in his prior 
post-conviction proceedings may be cause to overcome any procedural 
default of his underlying claim  
Mr. Kell raised this argument in his Memorandum in Support of his Petition and in 
his Memorandum Opposing Motion for Summary Judgment. (PCR II ROA 29-34, 808-
14.) The Court reviews the denial of post-conviction relief for correctness, with “no 
deference to the district court’s legal conclusions.” Poole, 2010 UT 25, ¶ 8; see also 
Wickham, 2002 UT 72, ¶ 7 (“Generally, an appeal from a judgment on a petition for post-
conviction relief raises questions of law reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to 
the post-conviction court’s conclusion.”). 
III. Whether the district court erred when it determined that Mr. Kell’s claim, 
which was defaulted in 2005 due to the ineffective assistance of prior post-
conviction counsel, was nonetheless subject to the 2008 amendments to the 
Post-Conviction Remedies Act (“PCRA”) and also could not be raised in a 
new petition for post-conviction relief 
These arguments were addressed in Mr. Kell’s Memorandum Opposing Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (PCR II ROA 807-14.) The Court reviews the denial of post-
conviction relief for correctness, with “no deference to the district court’s legal 
conclusions.” Poole, 2010 UT 25, ¶ 8; see also Wickham, 2002 UT 72, ¶ 7 (“Generally, an 
appeal from a judgment on a petition for post-conviction relief raises questions of law 
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reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the post-conviction court’s conclusion.”). 
IV. Whether the egregious-injustice exception, outlined by the Court in 
Winward v. State, provides an exception to the procedural default rules of 
the PCRA 
This argument was raised in Mr. Kell’s Memorandum Opposing Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (PCR II ROA 814-19.) The Court reviews the denial of post-
conviction relief for correctness, with “no deference to the district court’s legal 
conclusions.” Poole, 2010 UT 25, ¶ 8; see also Wickham, 2002 UT 72, ¶ 7 (“Generally, an 
appeal from a judgment on a petition for post-conviction relief raises questions of law 
reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the post-conviction court’s conclusion.”). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Statement of Facts 
On July 19, 1994, Petitioner Troy Michael Kell, along with his co-defendants, Eric 
Daniels, John Cannistraci, and Paul Payne, was charged with the aggravated murder of 
Lonnie Blackmon. (ROA 2-3.) The charging documents alleged that Mr. Kell committed 
the offense (1) while confined in a correctional institution; (2) after having been previously 
convicted of first degree murder and robbery on May 18, 1987; and (3) while under a 
sentence of life imprisonment for that same conviction. (ROA 2-3.) On September 23, 
1994, the State filed an Amended Information which additionally alleged that Mr. Kell 
committed the homicide “in an especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally 
depraved manner.” (ROA 120-21.) All pre-trial and trial proceedings were held inside the 
Central Utah Correctional Facility (CUCF) prison, in a room that was not designated as 
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public courtroom until November 15, 1995.  
Jury voir dire began in Mr. Kell’s case inside CUCF prison on June 6, 1996, and 
lasted through June 12, 1996. (ROA 2071-83.) The guilt phase of the trial lasted from June 
13, 1996, through June 21, 1996. (ROA 2084-2154.) On June 21, 1996, jurors found 
Mr. Kell guilty of aggravated murder. (ROA 2328.) The jurors also found all four 
aggravating circumstances proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (ROA 2329.)  
The penalty phase began on June 24, 1996. (ROA 2155.) On June 26, 1996, the jury 
returned a verdict of death. (ROA 2369.) Mr. Kell was sentenced to death by the trial judge 
on August 1, 1996. (Tr. 8/1/1996.) The trial judge stated that he was required, by state 
statute, to follow the jury’s verdict and impose a death sentence. (Tr. 8/1/1996 at 5908.)  
In the course of investigating his federal habeas petition, Mr. Kell’s federal habeas 
counsel spoke with the jurors and obtain signed declarations in May 2012. (See PCR II 
ROA 51-57) (Addendums 4-6.) Those declarations state that while jurors were deliberating 
during the penalty phase, the trial judge entered the room inside CUCF where jurors were 
deliberating and gave the jury an unconstitutional instruction, outside of the presence of 
Mr. Kell and his counsel, which shifted the burden of proof in the sentencing determination.  
Three jurors specifically recalled the judge providing clarification for them on a 
point of law during the penalty phase deliberations. One of these jurors specifically recalled 
that she had a difficult time voting for the death penalty until the trial judge came and spoke 
to jurors and told them “that Kell’s attorneys had to show us that Kell’s life should be 
spared.” (PCR II ROA 56 ¶ 2) (Addendum 6.) The judge’s supplemental instruction was 
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decisive for this juror in voting for death. (PCR II ROA 56 ¶ 4) (Addendum 6.) Two other 
jurors similarly recalled the judge giving an additional instruction to the jury. (PCR II ROA 
51, 53-54) (Addendums 4 & 5.) There are no indications in the trial transcripts or the record 
on appeal of a question from the jury after the beginning of deliberations, during either the 
guilt or penalty phases. (Tr. 6/21/1996 at 5464-67; Tr. 6/25/1996 at 5735-37; Tr. 6/26/1996 
at 5742.)  
II. Procedural History 
On August 1, 1996, Mr. Kell was sentenced to death in the Sixth District Court of 
Sanpete County, Utah. (Tr. 8/1/1996.) Mr. Kell’s direct appeal was denied on November 
1, 2002. State v. Kell, 2002 UT 106 (Kell I). Attorney Michael Esplin was initially 
appointed to represent Mr. Kell in his state post-conviction proceedings and filed a 
Preliminary Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in the state district court on May 16, 2003. 
(PCR ROA 1-5a.) Subsequently, Mr. Esplin withdrew and attorneys Aric Cramer and 
William Morrison were appointed. (PCR ROA 42-43, 54-55.) Mr. Cramer and Mr. 
Morrison filed an Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on August 1, 2005. (PCR 
II ROA 252-72) (Addendum 3.) The petition was only 21 pages in length, contained only 
one case citation, and appended no declarations or other new evidence. The state moved to 
dismiss the petition on December 2, 2012. (PCR ROA 290-93.) The state court granted the 
motion to dismiss on January 23, 2007, and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal 
on September 5, 2008. Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62 (Kell II).  
Federal habeas counsel were appointed on May 31, 2007, while Mr. Kell’s initial 
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state post-conviction proceedings were still ongoing. Following denial of his post-
conviction appeal by the Utah Supreme Court on September 5, 2008, Mr. Kell filed a 
Motion for Relief Pursuant to Utah Rule 60(b) in the state court on January 13, 2009. (PCR 
ROA 684-851.) In his Rule 60(b) motion, Mr. Kell alleged that he had received ineffective 
assistance of counsel in his post-conviction proceedings because counsel had failed to 
investigate and failed to raise many meritorious claims. On May 27, 2009, federal habeas 
counsel filed an initial petition in Mr. Kell’s federal habeas case. (Initial Pet. for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Kell v. Benzon, No. 2:07-CV-359-CW-PMW 
(D. Utah, May 27, 2009), ECF No. 36.) On June 12, 2009, counsel filed a Motion to Stay 
Federal Habeas Proceedings to resolve previously-pending state-court litigation. (Mot. to 
Stay Fed. Habeas Proc., Kell v. Benzon, No. 2:07-CV-359 (D. Utah, Jun. 12, 2009), ECF 
Nos. 40, 41.) In its order on Mr. Kell’s Motion to Stay, the federal district court noted that 
Mr. Kell had filed a “protective federal habeas petition,” despite still-pending state court 
litigation, in order to ensure compliance with the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) statute of limitations. (Mem. Decision and Order Granting Stay, 
Kell v. Benzon, No. 2:07-CV-359-CW-PMW (D. Utah, Oct. 10, 2009), ECF No. 51.) The 
district court granted the motion and stayed the case while the proceedings in state court 
were completed. 
The Utah Supreme Court issued its opinion on the Rule 60(b) appeal on May 4, 
2012. See Kell v. State, 2012 UT 25 (Kell III). Rehearing was denied on August 29, 2012 
and the case was remitted on September 24, 2012. See id.  
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Mr. Kell filed his Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the federal district 
court on January 14, 2013. (Am. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
2254, Kell v. Benzon, No. 2:07-CV-359-CW-PMW (D. Utah, Jan. 14, 2013), ECF No. 94.) 
In his Amended Petition, Mr. Kell included for the first time the claim that is the subject 
of this appeal, alleging that the trial judge gave jurors a supplemental instruction, outside 
the presence of Mr. Kell and his counsel, that unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof 
to Mr. Kell in the penalty phase. (Am. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Kell v. Benzon, No. 
2:07-CV-359-CW-PMW (D. Utah, Jan. 14, 2013), ECF No. 94.)   
Following the completion of litigation regarding discovery and evidentiary 
development, Mr. Kell filed a motion to stay the federal habeas proceedings pursuant to 
Rhines to allow him to return to state court to exhaust two claims that had not previously 
been exhausted. (Mot. to Stay Fed. Habeas Proc. and Mem. in Supp., Kell v. Benzon, No. 
2:07-CV-359-CW-PMW (D. Utah, Sep. 28, 2017), ECF No. 245.) On November 16, 2017, 
the district court granted Mr. Kell’s Rhines motion in part. (Mem. Decision and Order, Kell 
v. Benzon, No. 2:07-CV-359-CW (D. Utah, Nov. 16, 2017), ECF No. 258.) The district 
court held that Mr. Kell had established good cause under Rhines based on state post-
conviction counsel’s deficient performance. (Mem. Decision and Order, Kell v. Benzon, 
No. 2:07-CV-359-CW (D. Utah, Nov. 16, 2017), ECF No. 258 at 5.) The court found that 
post-conviction counsel “filed a perfunctory petition, failed to conduct even a cursory 
investigation of the case, including failing to interview even a single juror, and admitted 
that none of these decisions were strategic.” (Mem. Decision and Order, Kell v. Benzon, 
9 
 
No. 2:07-CV-359-CW (D. Utah, Nov. 16, 2017), ECF No. 258 at 5.) Counsel’s decision to 
limit investigation could not have been strategic, the court found, “because counsel had not 
conducted any investigation at all.” (Mem. Decision and Order, Kell v. Benzon, No. 2:07-
CV-359-CW (D. Utah, Nov. 16, 2017), ECF No. 258 at 5.) The court also found “no 
indication that Kell has engaged in intentional or abusive dilatory litigation tactics.” (Mem. 
Decision and Order, Kell v. Benzon, No. 2:07-CV-359-CW (D. Utah, Nov. 16, 2017), ECF 
No. 258 at 11.) The court found that Mr. Kell’s claim alleging that the trial judge gave 
jurors a supplemental instruction during penalty phase deliberations off the record and 
outside the presence of counsel, was “potentially significant.” (Mem. Decision and Order, 
Kell v. Benzon, No. 2:07-CV-359-CW (D. Utah, Nov. 16, 2017), ECF No. 258 at 10.)  
Pursuant to the district court’s stay order and authorization for federal habeas 
counsel to represent him in state court, Mr. Kell filed a petition for post-conviction review 
in the Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Sanpete County on January 16, 2018. (See 
PCR II ROA 1-36.) On July 3, 2018, the State responded by filing a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Following responsive briefing, the Honorable Wallace A. Lee granted the 
State’s Motion for Summary Judgement and dismissed Mr. Kell’s Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief. (See PCR II ROA 906-18) (Addendum 2.) This appeal followed, in 






SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court improperly dismissed Mr. Kell’s claim that his Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the trial judge gave jurors a 
supplemental instruction during their penalty phase deliberations, outside the presence of 
Mr. Kell or his counsel, that unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to Mr. Kell to 
demonstrate that his life should be spared. This claim was supported by declarations from 
three jurors.  
 This claim should have been raised in Mr. Kell’s initial post-conviction proceedings, 
however it was defaulted due to the ineffective assistance of Mr. Kell’s post-conviction 
counsel. At the time, Mr. Kell had a substantive right to the effective assistance of post-
conviction counsel. In a declaration submitted with Mr. Kell’s federal habeas petition, post-
conviction counsel acknowledged that he conducted minimal investigation during Mr. 
Kell’s post-conviction proceedings and that it did not occur to him to interview jurors. 
Ultimately, counsel filed a petition that was just 21 pages in length, a large portion of which 
simply repeated claims from Mr. Kell’s direct appeal, contained only one case citation, and 
did not append a single declaration or any other new evidence.  
 The district court erred in determining that Mr. Kell’s claim was procedurally barred 
because it should have been raised in a Rule 60(b) motion in Mr. Kell’s initial proceedings. 
Under this Court’s decisions in Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, and in Kell III, 2012 UT 
25, there is no support for the district court’s conclusion. The district court recognized that 
“Mr. Kell had the right to the effective assistance of counsel in his initial petition,” however 
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its decision would leave Mr. Kell in the untenable position of having a right with no 
remedy. The district court also erred in addressing Mr. Kell’s claim as though it were 
defaulted in 2013, instead of when it was actually defaulted in 2005. Because Mr. Kell’s 
right to the effective assistance of counsel in his initial post-conviction proceedings cannot 
retroactively be extinguished, this Court should find that the PCRA that was in effect at the 
time Mr. Kell’s claim was defaulted in 2005.  
 In the alternative, this Court should hold that the egregious injustice exception to 
the PCRA’s procedural bars, contemplated by this Court in Winward v. State, 2012 UT 85, 
applies and is satisfied here. Mr. Kell has satisfied the threshold requirements of Winward 
because he has demonstrated the meritoriousness of his claim and a reasonable justification 
for missing the deadline. See id. ¶ 18. In addition, Mr. Kell suggests two ways this court 
could define the egregious injustice exception. The Court could define an exception that 
mirrors the cause and prejudice exception to procedural default as articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 711 (1991), and Martinez v. Ryan, 566 
U.S. 1 (2012). Alternatively, the Court could define a more limited exception, applying 
only to petitioners under sentence of death who can identify a clear constitutional violation 
which, absent application of the egregious injustice exception, would never receive merits 
review. This application would serve to ensure that the egregious injustice exception is 
available in only the most serious of circumstances. Mr. Kell satisfies both articulations of 
this exception.  
 Finally, Mr. Kell argues that if he is without a remedy, the 2008 amendments to the 
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PCRA are an unconstitutional restriction on the authority of the Utah courts over the writ 
of habeas corpus. In order to avoid the constitutional infirmities of the 2008 amendments 
to the PCRA, this Court should conclude that judicial exceptions to the time and procedural 
bars continue to apply. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Mr. Kell’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights Were Violated When 
the Trial Judge Gave Jurors a Supplemental Instruction During Penalty 
Phase Deliberations, Outside the Presence of Mr. Kell or his Counsel, 
Which Shifted the Burden of Proof in the Penalty Phase to Mr. Kell in 
Violation of His Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights 
Mr. Kell’s rights to due process were violated when the trial court gave jurors an 
unconstitutional instruction, outside of the presence of Mr. Kell and his counsel and off the 
record, which shifted the burden of proof to Mr. Kell in the penalty phase of his trial.  
Three jurors specifically recall the judge providing clarification for them on a point 
of law during the penalty-phase deliberations. One of the jurors recalled that the judge 
came into the deliberation room to clarify a point regarding the burden of proof during 
sentencing, and her description of the judicial clarification establishes that what the judge 
said improperly shifted the burden to Mr. Kell. The juror recalled:  
I had a difficult time voting for the death penalty but I agreed to do so after 
Judge Mower came and spoke to the jurors as we deliberated. He told us that 
Mr. Kell’s attorneys had to show us that Mr. Kell’s life should be spared. The 
jury had bogged down over a definition but the judge’s statement helped 
because we wanted to be sure that we were doing the right thing. I remember 
that the judge was asked a question while he was speaking to us, and he 
kidded around and said he couldn’t address that question, and said that it was 




(PCR II ROA 56-57 ¶ 2) (Addendum 6.) The juror further recalled that “[t]here was no 
defense attorney present when the judge spoke to us during deliberations, though there was 
somebody with him.” (PCR II ROA 56-57 ¶ 3) (Addendum 6.) This misconduct by the 
judge, including the erroneous shifting of the burden of proof, was decisive for this juror 
in voting for death: “I had doubts about voting for the death penalty until the judge came 
in and said the defense needed to make you have that question, ‘Is there any doubt?’” (PCR 
II ROA 56-57 ¶ 4) (Addendum 6.)  
Two other jurors did not recall the specific instruction the trial judge gave, but 
distinctly recalled the occurrence. One juror stated, “I recall Judge Mower coming in to 
speak to the jury after we’d started deliberating. I don’t remember what the issue was but 
I do remember him coming in and clarifying something for us.” (PCR II ROA 51 ¶ 6) 
(Addendum 4.) Another juror recalled: “They [sic] jury asked the judge for a clarification. 
I believe it had to do with the range of sentences we could impose. I don’t remember how 
the answer came back to us, whether it was a written reply or spoken reply from the judge.” 
(PCR II ROA 53-54 ¶ 8) (Addendum 5.) There are no indications in the trial transcripts or 
the record on appeal of a question from the jury after the beginning of deliberations, during 
either the guilt or penalty phases. (Tr. 6/21/1996 at 5464-67, Tr. 6/25/1996 at 5735-37, and 
Tr. 6/26/1996 at 5742.) 
The judge’s actions in this case violated Mr. Kell’s state and federal constitutional 
rights. There is no justification for the State to depart “from strict adherence to basic 
principles of justice.” See State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 80 (Utah 1982). “For our system of 
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justice to command the respect of society, the law must be applied, in all cases, in a 
judicious and even-handed manner.” Id. In a death penalty case, both phases of the 
proceedings “must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause.” Gardner v. 
Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977). One of those requirements is the right to have the jury 
determine every material issue presented by the evidence. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 
U.S. 510, 520 (1979); see also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 (1980). An erroneous 
jury instruction impinges this right if “the jury was misled on the applicable law.” Smith v. 
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1235, 1250 (10th Cir. 2000). When there exists a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury relied on an unconstitutional understanding of the law in reaching 
a guilty verdict, that verdict must be set aside. See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 379-
80 (1990). 
The universality of presumptions regarding culpability and the burden of proof 
required for imposition of criminal sanctions in common-law jurisdictions “reflect a 
profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice 
administered.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-62 (1970) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 
391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968)). This means that in order for a jury to impose a capital sentence, 
it is incumbent on the State to prove the existence of any fact which they have alleged in 
justification of increasing the presumed punishment from life in prison to that of death. See 
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002). The burden is properly on the prosecution to 
prove that death is the appropriate punishment. The jury must be properly instructed that 
is where the burden lies, otherwise, the instructions are constitutionally infirm and reversal 
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is required.  
In its initial instructions, the trial court properly told jurors:  
It is presumed that a person convicted of aggravated murder will be sentenced 
to life in prison, unless and until the propriety of the death penalty or life in 
prison without parol[e] is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. This 
presumption is not a mere form to be disregarded by the jury at pleasure, but 
is a substantial essential part of the law and is binding upon the jury. 
(Tr. 6/25/1996 at 5686; see also Tr. 6/25/1996 at 5686-87 (“The burden of proof necessary 
for a verdict of death or for a verdict of life in prison without parole over life in prison in 
this case is upon the State. . . You may return a verdict of death only if . . . you are persuaded 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the totality of aggravating circumstances outweighs the 
totality of mitigating circumstances”); Tr. 6/25/1996 at 5687, 5688.) These instructions 
comport with Supreme Court precedent that the relative weight of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances is a finding that must be made beyond a reasonable doubt by a 
jury. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 622 (2016); Ring, 536 U.S. at 589. The trial judge’s 
supplemental instruction to the jury outside the presence of counsel, however, tainted the 
deliberation process and unconstitutionally shifted the burden to Mr. Kell to prove that his 
life should be spared.  
The judge’s actions also violated the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, once the case has been submitted to the jury, the bailiff 
is charged with preserving the integrity of the deliberations and is instructed that, “[e]xcept 
by order of the court, the officer . . . shall not allow any communication to be made to them, 
or make any himself, except to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict.” Utah R. 
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Crim. P. 17(m). If the jury has a question on a point of law, the rules provide that they shall 
“inform the officer in charge of them, who shall communicate such request to the court.” 
Rule 17(n). The rule then allows the court either to bring in the jury, in the presence of the 
parties, and respond to the question, or to send in a written response, which is then entered 
into the record. Id. While a court may on occasion respond to a jury question outside the 
presence of the parties and without their input, such a response must be “in writing” and, 
“[i]f the judge chooses this course, he or she must at some point enter the question and 
answer into the record, giving counsel opportunity to object to the instruction.” State v. 
Lucero, 866 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Furthermore, the instruction must not be “an 
incorrect or misleading statement of the law.” Id. The instruction is prejudicial, and 
therefore constitutes reversible error, if there is “a reasonable likelihood that in its absence 
there would have been a different result.” State v. Kozik, 688 P.2d 459, 461 (Utah 1984) 
(quoting State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1980)). Under the circumstances here, the 
“ex parte communications between the judge and the jury . . . necessitate overturning [the] 
conviction.” State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 69 and n.60 (citing United States v. U.S. 
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 460 (1978) (finding prejudice when judge met privately with 
jury foreman and gave supplemental jury instruction)). Where a “judge discusses 
substantive matters with jurors,” this Court should presume prejudice. Id. ¶ 70. 
The United States Supreme Court rightfully places great emphasis on the propriety 
of the interactions between a judge and a jury. The judge is “the governor of the trial for 
the purpose of assuring its proper conduct and of determining questions of law.” Quercia 
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v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933). “[T]he influence of the trial judge on the jury 
is necessarily and properly of great weight, and . . . his lightest word or intimation is 
received with deference and may prove controlling.” Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 
626 (1894). “[T]he judge’s last word is apt to be the decisive word.” Bollenbach v. United 
States, 326 U.S. 607, 612 (1946). Given “the place of importance that trial by jury has in 
our Bill of Rights” it is incumbent upon our courts to protect “ascertainment of guilt by a 
jury under appropriate judicial guidance, however cumbersome that process may be.” Id. 
at 615. This is one of those “basic principles of justice” that requires “strict adherence.” 
Wood, 648 P.2d at 80. It is a principle that must be adhered to in order to “satisfy the 
requirements of the Due Process Clause.” Gardner, 430 U.S. at 358. 
The trial judge’s decision to address the jury on a point of law outside of the 
presence of the parties was, at the very least, imprudent and risked irrevocably tainting the 
jury deliberation process. His failure to enter the jury question and his response into the 
record was also a violation of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Most importantly, 
Judge Mower’s ex parte instruction to jurors unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof 
for the entire penalty proceeding away from the State and onto Mr. Kell, and requires 
reversal. On this basis, Mr. Kell is entitled to relief. 
II. The District Court Erred in Finding that Mr. Kell’s Claim was 
Procedurally Barred 
At the time of his initial post-conviction proceedings, Mr. Kell had a statutory right 
to the effective assistance of his post-conviction counsel. Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 
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¶ 84. Mr. Kell’s post-conviction counsel did not meet the standards of constitutionally 
effective assistance because he failed to conduct an objectively reasonable investigation of 
the case. Counsel failed to interview any jurors and failed to present Mr. Kell’s claim that 
the trial judge, ex parte, gave jurors an unconstitutional supplemental instruction.  
The district court recognized that Mr. Kell did have a right to the effective assistance 
of post-conviction counsel in his initial post-conviction proceedings. (PCR II ROA 909) 
(Addendum 2.) However, the court found that Mr. Kell’s claim was nonetheless 
procedurally barred. The court based this decision in part on its conclusion that this Court’s 
decision in Menzies required Mr. Kell to present his argument in a Rule 60(b) motion in 
his initial case, rather than in a new petition. (PCR II ROA 909) (Addendum 2.) The court 
further determined that the accrual date for Mr. Kell’s claim would have been 2013, and 
therefore the ineffective assistance of Mr. Kell’s post-conviction counsel was not relevant 
to determining whether the claim was procedurally barred. (PCR II ROA 910-11) 
(Addendum 2.) The court did not consider whether the default could be excused based on 
the claim’s actual accrual date of 2005. The district court erred in finding Mr. Kell’s claim 
to be procedurally barred. Mr. Kell’s claim should be decided on the merits.  
A. Mr. Kell Had a Statutory Right to the Effective Assistance of Post-
Conviction Counsel During the Time in Which His Claim was 
Defaulted and Can Excuse the Default Based on the Ineffective 
Assistance of Post-Conviction Counsel 
The district court correctly found that in his initial post-conviction proceedings, Mr. 
Kell had a statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel in post-conviction. (See PCR 
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II ROA 906-18) (Addendum 2.) The court further noted that “[n]othing in the amendments 
to the PCRA indicates that the removal of the right to the effective assistance of counsel 
should apply retroactively.” (See PCR II ROA 906-18) (Addendum 2.)  
It was undisputed in the court below that Mr. Kell’s post-conviction counsel 
provided ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to Mr. Kell’s claim that jurors were 
given a supplemental instruction outside the presence of Mr. Kell or his counsel that 
unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to Mr. Kell in the penalty phase. (See, e.g., 
PCR II ROA 724-49.) Post-conviction counsel was aware at the time of his appointment 
“that the standard for post-conviction representation in a death-penalty case involves a 
complete reinvestigation of the case” and admitted he “did not do this.” (PCR II ROA 59-
61 ¶ 8) (Addendum 7); see American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and 
Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, Guideline 10.10.2, cmt. n. 260, (2d ed. 
2003), reprinted in 31 Hofstra L. Rev. 913, 1080 (2003) (hereinafter “ABA Guidelines”) 
(“[C]ounsel investigating a capital case should be particularly alert” to investigating jury 
issues “and make every effort to develop the relevant facts, whether by interviewing jurors 
or otherwise. Such inquiries can be ‘critical in discovering constitutional errors.’”). 
Counsel describes his professional failures in this case as being caused partially by 
being under-funded and partially as omissions without excuse. (PCR II ROA 59-61 ¶¶ 6-
12, 14) (Addendum 7.) For instance, juror interviews were something that “did not occur 
to me to do.” (PCR II ROA 59-61 ¶ 8) (Addendum 7.) Had counsel interviewed the jurors 
he would have discovered evidence of this erroneous supplemental instruction described 
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above. Had he been aware of this information, he would have raised a claim in the post-
conviction petition. (PCR II ROA 59-61 ¶¶ 3-4) (Addendum 7.)  
This Court has held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984), provides the appropriate framework for assessing whether a 
petitioner’s statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel has been violated. Menzies, 
2006 UT 81, ¶ 86 (“We can discern no reason why a statutory right to effective assistance 
of counsel should be premised on something different from that of the constitutional right: 
ensuring that the proceeding is reliable and fair by requiring a properly functioning 
adversarial process.”); see also State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 185-86 (Utah 1990) 
(referring to the state court having adopted the Strickland standard of review of ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims and its uniform application to trial, appeals, and habeas 
proceedings). Under Strickland, counsel is ineffective if: (1) the “representation fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness;” and (2) “there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.” Id. at 688, 694.  
The inquiry under the deficiency prong is “whether counsel’s assistance was 
reasonable considering all the circumstances.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Although 
defense counsel has broad discretion when making strategic decisions, those decisions 
must be reasonable and informed. Id. at 691. The failure to adequately investigate a case 
cannot be considered a reasonable strategic decision. See Gregg v. State, 2012 UT 32, ¶ 24 
(quoting Templin, 805 P.2d at 188-89 and Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689); see also Correll v. 
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Ryan, 539 F.3d 938, 949 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (finding that an “uninformed strategy” 
is “no strategy at all”). 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a decision to cease investigation must 
itself be based on a reasonable investigation. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91; Williams 
v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533-34 (2003); see 
also ABA Guideline 10.15.1(C), (E)(4) and commentary(“[C]ollateral counsel cannot rely 
on the previously compiled record but must conduct a thorough, independent investigation” 
because “the trial record is unlikely to provide either a complete or accurate picture of the 
facts and issues in the case”); ABA Guideline 10.15.1(E)(4) (post-conviction counsel must 
“continue an aggressive investigation of all aspects of the case”).  
The Strickland prejudice analysis does not depend on whether the outcome of the 
proceeding would have been different. “[A]n analysis focusing solely on mere outcome 
determination, without attention to whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally 
unfair or unreliable, is defective.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993). A 
reviewing court must find that prejudice exists if “there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “[r]easonable probability” is defined as “a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. 
Post-conviction counsel admitted that he understood that the prevailing professional 
norms in a post-conviction case require a full reinvestigation of every aspect of the case, 
and that he did not undertake such an investigation. (See PCR II ROA 59-61 ¶ 8) 
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(Addendum 7.) Certain aspects of the investigation went undone simply because it did not 
occur to him to conduct such an investigation. (See PCR II ROA 59-61 ¶ 8) (Addendum 
7.) Counsel himself described his work—some legal research and some investigation of 
the victim—as “shallow.” (See PCR II ROA 59-61 ¶ 12) (Addendum 7.)  
Post-conviction counsel stated that “[n]one of my failures were the result of my 
strategy” and “any strategy decisions I made were tainted by my inability to fully 
investigate the case.” (See PCR II ROA 59-61 ¶ 14) (Addendum 7.) Furthermore, counsel 
stated that “[w]ithin a few months of our appointment” his co-counsel “stopped 
contributing to the case.” (See PCR II ROA 59-61 ¶ 9) (Addendum 7.) Thus, Mr. Kell was 
abandoned by one of his post-conviction attorneys, and left only with one who lacked 
experience and who failed to conduct a minimally adequate investigation of the case. (See 
PCR II ROA 59-61 ¶¶ 1, 9) (Addendum 7); see also Mem. Decision and Order, Kell v. 
Benzon, 2:07-CV-359 (D. Utah, Nov. 16, 2017), ECF No. 258 (finding “[post-conviction] 
counsel filed a perfunctory petition, failed to conduct even a cursory investigation of the 
case, including failing to interview even a single juror, and admitted that none of these 
decisions were strategic”).) 
As a result of post-conviction counsel’s deficient performance, Mr. Kell was denied 
the opportunity to have this significant claim reviewed by any state court. See Martinez, 
566 U.S. at 10 (“When an attorney errs in initial-review collateral proceedings, it is likely 
that no state court at any level will hear the prisoner’s claim.”). Mr. Kell’s claim regarding 
the unconstitutional supplemental instruction was supported by statements from multiple 
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jurors. Had counsel investigated and presented this claim in Mr. Kell’s initial post-
conviction proceedings, there is a reasonable probability that he would have obtained relief. 
Although the State did not dispute that post-conviction counsel provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the court below did not address this argument.  
B. The District Court Incorrectly Decided the Procedural Status of 
Mr. Kell’s Claim 
Rather than addressing Mr. Kell’s claim regarding the ineffective assistance of his 
post-conviction counsel, the district court incorrectly held that Mr. Kell’s claim was barred 
because it should have been submitted as a Rule 60(b) motion in his initial case, and 
because it was subject to the 2008 amendments to the PCRA and was therefore 
procedurally barred. The court’s rulings are incorrect.  
First, the district court improperly limited the remedies available for a petitioner 
who has been denied the statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel. Relying on 
Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, the district court found that “although Mr. Kell had the 
right to the effective assistance of counsel in his initial petition, the proper procedure is to 
raise his argument in a Rule 60(b) motion in his initial case and not in a subsequent 
petition.” (See PCR II ROA 909) (Addendum 2.) The court found that “[n]othing in 
Menzies indicates that filing a subsequent petition is the appropriate procedure for the 
denial of the statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel.” Id. This Court’s decision 
in Menzies, however, does not address the appropriate procedure to remedy the denial of a 
statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel. The Menzies decision found only that 
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there was a statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel in post-conviction 
proceedings, and that Mr. Menzies had satisfied the requirements of Rule 60(b)(6) based 
on his denial of that right. See Menzies, 2006 UT 81, ¶¶ 78, 84, 100. The Court in Menzies 
held that ineffective assistance of counsel “may allow a litigant relief” under Rule 60(b)(6). 
Id. ¶78.  
Indeed, in Mr. Kell’s own case, this Court denied relief on a Rule 60(b) motion 
because it found that the ruling in Menzies applied only to default judgments. See Kell v. 
State, 2012 UT 25, ¶¶ 19-20. Although this Court has not explicitly defined the correct 
procedure or remedy for a petitioner who has been denied his statutory right to the effective 
assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, the Court’s decisions in Menzies and 
Kell suggest that a Rule 60(b) motion is only appropriate where a petitioner’s case has been 
defaulted entirely. It does not follow, however, that a petitioner who received ineffective 
assistance of counsel in his initial post-conviction proceedings can be left without any 
avenue to enforce that right. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“The 
government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and 
not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no 
remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”).  
Second, the district court found that “under the most generous analysis of the 
claim’s accrual date, Mr. Kell had until May of 2013 to file his petition in state court.” (See 
PCR II ROA 906-18) (Addendum 2.) The court then conducted its analysis assuming that 
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the only possible accrual date of Mr. Kell’s claim was May 2013.2 However, the PCRA in 
effect at the time of Mr. Kell’s initial post-conviction proceedings contained a one-year 
statute of limitations running from, at the latest, “the date on which petitioner knew or 
should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which 
the petition is based.” Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107 (2004) (Addendum 1.) It is undisputed 
that the basis of Mr. Kell’s claim would have been discoverable had Mr. Kell’s post-
conviction counsel exercised reasonable diligence. (PCR II ROA 730-31.) Thus, Mr. Kell’s 
claim was defaulted in 2005, not in 2013, as the district court found. Had Mr. Kell filed a 
petition including this claim in 2013, the court almost certainly would have found that it 
had already been defaulted. Furthermore, the claim was defaulted when Mr. Kell had a 
statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel, but was not afforded that right. See 
Menzies, 2006 UT 81 at ¶ 84. The district court erred in not addressing the procedural 
posture of Mr. Kell’s claim based on the date when the claim was actually defaulted, in 
2005, at a time when Mr. Kell had a right to the effective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel.  
                                                 
2 Mr. Kell argued in his Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment that if the district 
court were to find that the 2008 amendments to the PCRA did apply to Mr. Kell’s case, 
which Mr. Kell maintained they did not, the district court should nonetheless find that Mr. 
Kell’s claim was not time-barred because he filed it at the earliest possible time he could, 
given the pendency of his federal habeas case and the limitations placed on his federal 
counsel. (PCR II ROA 804-29.) The district court addressed only this argument, and not 
Mr. Kell’s primary argument that the 2008 amendments to the PCRA do not apply to Mr. 
Kell’s claim because at the time it was initially defaulted Mr. Kell had a statutory right to 
the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. (See PCR II ROA 804-29.)  
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C. This Court Should Find that the Procedural Bars of the Current 
PCRA Do Not Apply to Mr. Kell’s Claim 
At the time that Mr. Kell’s claim was defaulted, he had a statutory right to the 
effective assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings. Menzies, 2006 UT 81 at ¶ 
82 (“We refuse merely to pay lip service to this legislatively created protection by holding 
that a petitioner in a post-conviction death penalty proceeding is only entitled to ineffective 
assistance of appointed counsel.”). Although the state legislature amended the PCRA in 
2008 to extinguish the right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, see Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-9-202(4) (2008) (Addendum 1), the legislature did not retroactively 
terminate the rights that Mr. Kell had during his initial post-conviction proceedings. (See 
PCR II ROA 906-18) (Addendum 2.); Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (2014) (Addendum 1.); 
Olsen v. Samuel McIntyre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257, 261 (Utah 1998) (“A long-standing rule 
of statutory construction is that we do not apply retroactively legislative enactments that 
alter substantive law or affect vested rights unless the legislature has clearly expressed that 
intention.”). Thus, the PCRA that was in effect at the time that Mr. Kell’s claim was 
defaulted should apply here.  
III. In the Alternative, This Court Should Find that the Judicial Exceptions to 
the PCRA Apply  
Even if this Court finds that the prior version of the PCRA does not apply, Mr. Kell 
should still receive merits consideration of his claim under the judicial exceptions to the 
PCRA. This Court has recognized that “because ‘the power to review post-conviction 
petitions ‘quintessentially . . . belongs to the judicial branch of government,’’ and not the 
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legislature, . . . [the] common law exceptions ‘retain their independent constitutional 
significance and may be examined by this court in our review of post-conviction petitions.” 
Tillman v. State, 2005 UT 56, ¶ 22, (quoting Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42, ¶ 14 and 
Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Utah 1989)). Furthermore, “to the degree that the 
PCRA purports to erect an absolute bar to this court’s consideration of successive post-
conviction petitions, it suffers from constitutional infirmities.” Gardner, 2004 UT 42, ¶ 17. 
The Court noted in Gardner v. State that it had not considered whether the 2008 
amendments to the PCRA “now wholly accommodate the full measure of our constitutional 
authority or whether the Utah Constitution requires that we be able to consider, in some 
cases, the merits of claims otherwise barred by the PCRA.” 2010 UT 46, ¶ 93. The court 
declined to decide the issue in that case. 
The Utah Supreme Court again declined to directly address the issue in Winward v. 
State, 2012 UT 85, ¶ 8, because the issue had not been raised below. The court further 
noted that it would be “improvident” to address the issue where the underlying claim was 
not meritorious.3 Id. ¶ 17.  
The court nonetheless set forth a framework for considering whether a petitioner 
qualifies for an exception to the PCRA’s procedural bars. As a threshold matter, a petitioner 
                                                 
3 In neither Gardner nor Winward did the state contest “the existence of an ‘egregious 
injustice’ exception to the PCRA’s procedural limitations[.]” Winward, 2012 UT 85, ¶ 16; 
see also Gardner, 2010 UT 46, ¶ 93 (“The State acknowledges that this court retains 
constitutional authority, even when a petition is procedurally barred, to determine whether 
denying relief would result in an egregious injustice.”). 
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“must demonstrate that he has a reasonable justification for missing the deadline combined 
with a meritorious defense.” Id. ¶ 18 (citing Gardner, 2010 UT 46, ¶ 94). To satisfy this 
threshold test, a petitioner must show that “given the combined weight of the 
meritoriousness of the petitioner’s claim and the justifications for raising it late, the court 
should consider recognizing an exception to the PCRA’s procedural rules.” Id. ¶ 20 
(quoting Gardner, 2010 UT 46, ¶ 94, internal quotation marks omitted). The Court stated 
this is a “flexible test” which requires the petition have “‘an arguable basis in fact,’ which 
would ‘support a claim for relief as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Adams v. State, 2005 
UT 62, ¶ 19.) In addition, the petitioner must demonstrate “a reasonable justification for 
missing the deadline[.]” Id. ¶ 18. A “mere allegation” of ineffective assistance of counsel 
is insufficient to meet this requirement. Id. ¶ 21.4 In addition to satisfying the threshold 
requirements, a petitioner should “include an articulation of the exception itself, its 
parameters, and the basis for this court’s constitutional authority for recognizing such an 
exception” and “demonstrate why the particular facts of his case qualify under the 
parameters of the proposed exception.” Id. ¶ 18. 
As discussed above, Mr. Kell has satisfied the threshold requirement under 
Winward. Counsel in Mr. Kell’s initial post-conviction proceedings conducted virtually no 
                                                 
4 The court found that Mr. Winward had not satisfied this standard because he did not allege 
“any facts to support his claim regarding the ineffectiveness of his [post-conviction] 
counsel.” Winward, 2012 UT 85, ¶ 21. The court also found that Mr. Winward’s claims 
were not meritorious because his factual allegations were not supported by the record in 
the case. Id. ¶¶ 22-27. 
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investigation and filed a petition that was just 21 pages in length, contained only one case 
citation, and did not append a single declaration or any other new evidence. (See PCR II 
ROA 107-27) (Addendum 2.) Mr. Kell’s claim that his post-conviction counsel provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel was supported by declarations, including an admission 
from counsel that he did not investigate Mr. Kell’s claim and had no strategic basis for 
failing to do so. (ROA 59-61 ¶ 14) (Addendum 7.) 
Mr. Kell’s underlying claim for relief is also supported by “sufficient factual 
evidence or legal authority to support a conclusion of meritoriousness.” Winward, 2012 
UT 85, ¶ 20. Mr. Kell alleged that the trial judge gave jurors an unconstitutional 
supplemental instruction, off the record and outside the presence of Mr. Kell and his 
counsel, in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (See PCR II ROA 17-
35.) In support of this claim, Mr. Kell provided declarations from three jurors who recalled 
the trial judge entering the room while the jury was deliberating, outside the presence of 
Mr. Kell or his counsel, and giving jurors a supplemental instruction which 
unconstitutionally shifted the burden to Mr. Kell to prove why his life should be spared. 
(See PCR II ROA 51-57) (Addendums 4-6.) In particular, one juror recalled that she “had 
a difficult time voting for the death penalty” but felt more comfortable after the trial judge 
came into the room and told the jurors “that Kell’s attorneys had to show us that Kell’s life 
should be spared.” (PCR II ROA 56 ¶ 2) (Addendum 6.) The trial judge’s instruction 
violated both Utah and federal constitutional law. See supra Section I; see also, e.g., Hurst 
v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 622 (2016); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002); Smith 
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v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1235, 1250 (10th Cir. 2000). Mr. Kell has established at 
least “‘an arguable basis in fact,’ which would ‘support a claim for relief as a matter of 
law.’” Winward, 2012 UT 85, ¶ 20 (quoting Adams, 2005 UT 62, ¶ 19). 
Second, Winward requires that a petitioner’s briefing include “an articulation of the 
exception itself, its parameters, and the basis for this court’s constitutional authority for 
recognizing such an exception.” Winward, 2012 UT 85, ¶ 18. The petitioner must then 
“demonstrate why the particular facts of his case qualify under the parameters of the 
proposed exception.” Id. Mr. Kell suggested in the court below that the egregious injustice 
exception should track the exceptions to procedural default that apply in federal court. (See 
PCR II ROA 804-29.) Although under federal law there is no constitutional right to counsel 
in post-conviction proceedings, see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755 (1991), the 
Supreme Court has recognized that “inadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review 
collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim[.]” 
Martinez, 566 U.S. at 9.  
A more limited alternative would be for this Court to confine the egregious injustice 
exception to instances where, after meeting the threshold requirements of Winward, a 
petitioner under sentence of death identifies a clear constitutional violation that occurred 
during either phase of trial which, absent application of the egregious injustice exception, 
would never be reviewed on the merits. By limiting the exception to capital cases, this 
exception would recognize the long-standing maxim that “death is different.” See Harmelin 
v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 414 (1986) 
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(discussing the “heightened concern for fairness and accuracy that has characterized our 
review of the process requisite to the taking of a human life”). Because capital cases are 
rare in Utah,5 it would also serve to limit the availability of the egregious injustice 
exception to the most serious of circumstances, where petitioners might potentially be 
executed without ever having a meritorious constitutional claim addressed on the merits by 
any court.  
Mr. Kell satisfies this exception because if he is unable to obtain review of his claim 
in the Utah courts, it is almost certain that no court, state or federal, will ever review the 
merits of his claim before Mr. Kell is potentially executed. As discussed above, Mr. Kell 
satisfies the threshold requirement of Winward because counsel in his initial post-
conviction proceedings provided ineffective assistance in failing to investigate or present 
a substantial claim that Mr. Kell’s constitutional rights were violated when the trial judge 
gave an unconstitutional instruction to jurors outside the presence of Mr. Kell that shifted 
the burden of proof to Mr. Kell in the penalty phase of his trial. Mr. Kell’s significant 
constitutional claim is supported by declarations from three of the jurors on his case. One 
of these jurors confirmed that prior to the judge’s unconstitutional instruction, she was not 
in favor of a death sentence. On the basis of the facts and law alleged above, Mr. Kell has 
satisfied the egregious injustice exception to procedural default as articulated in Winward. 
                                                 
5 There are currently only eight people on death row in Utah. Furthermore, since 2000, only 
two death sentences have been handed down in Utah, one of which was a resentencing. See 
State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46; State v. Lovell, 2011 UT 36.  
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As discussed more fully below, this Court has the authority to apply judicial 
exceptions to the procedural default rules contained in the PCRA. The Utah Supreme Court 
retains the authority to “issue all extraordinary writs.” Utah Const. art. VIII, § 3 
(Addendum 1.) In Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989), this Court discussed the 
historical context and the importance of the writ of habeas corpus, as well as its 
development through the case law. The court noted that “the writ of habeas corpus is the 
only legal form of judicial process referred to in the Utah and United States Constitutions” 
and that it “has played such a large role in the history of our law that it has received specific 
constitutional protection.” Id. at 1033. The court further noted that  
[T]he separation of powers provision, Article V, section 1 of the Utah 
Constitution, requires, and the Open Courts Provision of the Declaration of 
Rights, Article I, Section 11, presupposes, a judicial department armed with 
process sufficient to fulfill its role as the third branch of government. While 
the essence of judicial power cannot be encapsulated in one writ, the writ of 
habeas corpus is one of the most important of all judicial tools for the 
protection of individual liberty. 
Id. at 1033-34. The Court went on to note initially the Writ was only available to attack a 
criminal conviction on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction or that a sentence was 
unlawful. Id. at 1034. The court nonetheless recognized a broader application for the writ, 
holding the Writ would lie if a petitioner had been deprived of one of his constitutional 
rights. Id. (citing Thompson v. Harris, 144 P.2d 761, 766 (Utah 1943)). This Court thus 





IV. If Mr. Kell is Without a Remedy, then the 2008 Amendments to the PCRA 
are Unconstitutional and this Court Should Exercise its Traditional 
Common Law Authority over Collateral Proceedings  
The Utah Constitution makes clear the importance of the writ of habeas corpus and 
that the courts hold the power to grant the writ. The Utah constitution provides, “The 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion 
or invasion, the public safety requires it.” Utah Const. art. I, § 5 (Addendum 1.) This 
language corresponds, almost exactly, with that from the federal constitution, which states, 
“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended unless when in Cases 
of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 
(Addendum 1.) The Utah Constitution further gives the courts the authority “to issue all 
extraordinary writs,” and the Utah Supreme Court “power to issue all writs and orders 
necessary for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction or the complete 
determination of any cause.” Utah Const. art. VIII, §§ 3, 5 (Addendum 1.) Among these 
extraordinary writs is the writ of the habeas corpus. See Petersen v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 
907 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Utah 1995) (“[T]he Legislature cannot curtail the constitutional 
powers of this Court to issue extraordinary writs in appropriate circumstances.”). Because 
the courts’ writ power is granted directly by the constitution, the legislature has no authority 
to diminish or restrict that power. See Brown v. Cox, 2017 UT 3, ¶ 14. 
Since the founding, the Great Writ has been available to correct “jurisdictional 
errors and to [correct] errors so gross as to in effect deprive the defendant of his 
constitutional substantive or procedural rights.” Thompson v. Harris, 152 P.2d 91, 102 
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(Utah 1944). As the Utah Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he writ of habeas corpus is the only 
legal form of judicial process referred to in the Utah and United States Constitutions.” 
Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1033. Since the founding of the state, that power has unambiguously 
been vested in the judicial branch without limitation, short of a complete suspension when 
the public safety requires it. See id. at 1033 (“Quintessentially, the Writ belongs to the 
judicial branch of government.”). 
The 2008 amendments to the PCRA purport to restrict the authority of the Utah 
courts over the writ of habeas corpus. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-102(1)(a) (2008). The 
Utah Supreme Court has previously held that such restrictions on the Great Writ are 
impermissible. Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 254 (Utah 1998); see also Tillman, 2005 UT 
56, ¶ 22 (“[B]ecause ‘the power to review post-conviction petitions ‘quintessentially . . . 
belongs to the judicial branch of government,’ and not the legislature, . . . [the] law 
exceptions ‘retain their independent constitutional significance and may be examined by 
this court in our review of post-conviction petitions.’” (quoting Gardner, 2004 UT 42, ¶ 
17, and Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1033)). In Julian, the State sought to assert two different statute 
of limitations against a petitioner seeking post-conviction relief. The first was the general 
civil statute of limitations that required claims to be filed within four years, without any 
exceptions. 966 P.2d at 250-52. The second was the one-year statute of limitations in the 
then newly enacted PCRA, which at that time included an “interests of justice” exception. 
Id. at 253-54 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(1) & (3) (1996)). 
Considering the four-year statute of limitations, the court held that an absolute limit 
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without exception was unconstitutional because it “removed flexibility and discretion from 
state judicial procedure” so that the courts’ “ability to guarantee fairness and equity in 
particular cases” was diminished. Id. at 253. Regarding the one-year statute of limitations 
in the PCRA, the court noted that the “interests of justice” exception should be construed 
narrowly, applying only in “truly exceptional” circumstances, “so as to promote finality 
and to protect defendants from having to defend stale claims.” Id. at 254. The Utah 
Supreme Court rejected the State’s argument: 
We fully appreciate the State’s concerns. We emphasize, however, that when 
a court grants relief pursuant to a habeas corpus petition, it does so on the 
ground that the petitioner has been wrongfully incarcerated. That is to say, a 
court should grant relief if the petitioner establishes that he or she has been 
deprived of due process of law or that it would be unconscionable not to re-
examine the conviction. Therefore, if the proper showing is made, the mere 
passage of time can never justify continued imprisonment of one who has 
been deprived of fundamental rights, regardless of how difficult it may be 
for the State to reprosecute that individual. 
Id. at 254 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The only way to avoid the 
constitutional infirmities of the 2008 amendments to the PCRA is to conclude that the 
judicial exceptions to the time and procedural bars survive the amendments. 
CONCLUSION 
 Based on the foregoing, Mr. Kell asks this Court to reverse the district court order 
granting summary judgment and remand this case so that Mr. Kell’s claim can be addressed 
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Section 9, Clause 2. Suspension of Habeas Corpus, USCA CONST Art. I § 9, cl. 2
 © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
United States Code Annotated
Constitution of the United States
Annotated
Article I. The Congress
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. I § 9, cl. 2
Section 9, Clause 2. Suspension of Habeas Corpus
Currentness
The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it.
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. I § 9, cl. 2, USCA CONST Art. I § 9, cl. 2
Current through P.L. 116-5. Title 26 current through 116-7.
End of Document © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
Utah Constitution
Page 1
Article I, Section 5 [Habeas corpus.]
          The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or
invasion, the public safety requires it.
Utah Constitution
Page 1
Article VIII, Section 3 [Jurisdiction of Supreme Court.]
          The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to answer
questions of state law certified by a court of the United States.  The Supreme Court shall have
appellate jurisdiction over all other matters to be exercised as provided by statute, and power to
issue all writs and orders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction or the
complete determination of any cause.
Utah Constitution
Page 1
Article VIII, Section 5 [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts -- Right of appeal.]
          The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by this
constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs.  The district court shall have
appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute.  The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and
appellate, shall be provided by statute.  Except for matters filed originally with the Supreme Court,
there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with
appellate jurisdiction over the cause.
1996 Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107 
1996 Utah Code Archive 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED > TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE > PART IV. PARTICULAR 
PROCEEDINGS > CHAPTER 35a. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT > PART 1. GENERAL 
PROVISIONS 
§ 78-35a-107. Statute of limitations for post-conviction relief
(1 )A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year after the cause of action has 
accrued. 
(2)For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the following dates:
(a)the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of conviction, if no appeal is
taken;
(b)the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over the case, if an appeal is
taken;
(c)the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court or the United States
Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is filed;
(d)the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of the decision on the petition
for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of certiorari is filed; or
(e)the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of
evidentiary facts on which the petition is based.
(3)If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may excuse a petitioner's failure to file within the
time limitations.
(4)Sections 78-12-35 and 78-12-40 do not extend the limitations period established in this section.
History 
C.1953, 78-12-31.1, enacted by L.1995, ch. 82, § 1; renumbered by L.1996, ch. 235, § 7.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright© 2019 by Michie, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights reserved. 
End of Document 
2004 Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107
2004 Utah Code Archive
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED  >  TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE  >  PART IV. PARTICULAR 
PROCEEDINGS  >  CHAPTER 35a. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT  >  PART 1. GENERAL 
PROVISIONS
§ 78-35a-107. Statute of limitations for postconviction relief
(1)A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year after the cause of action has
accrued.
(2)For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the following dates:
(a)the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of conviction, if no appeal is
taken;
(b)the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over the case, if an appeal is
taken;
(c)the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court or the United States
Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is filed;
(d)the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of the decision on the petition
for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of certiorari is filed; or
(e)the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of
evidentiary facts on which the petition is based.
(3)If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may excuse a petitioner's failure to file within the
time limitations.
(4)Sections 77-19-8, 78-12-35, and 78-12-40 do not extend the limitations period established in this section.
History
C. 1953, 78-12-31.1, enacted by L. 1995, ch. 82, § 1; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 235, § 7; 2004, ch. 139, § 2.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED





Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-102
 Statutes current through the 2018 Third Special Session 
Utah Code Annotated  >  Title 78B Judicial Code (Chs. 1 — 21)  >  Chapter 9 Postconviction 
Remedies Act (Pts. 1 — 4)  >  Part 1 General Provisions (§§ 78B-9-101 — 78B-9-110)
78B-9-102. Replacement of prior remedies.
(1)
(a)This chapter establishes the sole remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for 
a criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal except as 
provided in Subsection (2). This chapter replaces all prior remedies for review, including extraordinary 
or common law writs. Proceedings under this chapter are civil and are governed by the rules of civil 
procedure. Procedural provisions for filing and commencement of a petition are found in Rule 65C, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(b)A court may not enter an order to withdraw, modify, vacate or otherwise set aside a plea unless it is 
in conformity with this chapter or Section 77-13-6.
(2)This chapter does not apply to:
(a)habeas corpus petitions that do not challenge a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense;
(b)motions to correct a sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; or
(c)actions taken by the Board of Pardons and Parole.
History
C. 1953, 78-35a-102, enacted by L. 1996, ch. 235, § 2; renumbered by L. 2008, ch. 3, § 1166; 2008, ch. 288, § 2; 
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This chapter replaces prior remedies that challenge a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense; it may not be 
applied retroactively to a post-conviction relief action. Julian v. State, 2002 UT 61, 451 Utah Adv. 6, 52 P.3d 1168, 
2002 Utah LEXIS 86 (Utah 2002), superseded by statute as stated in Mulder v. State, 2016 UT App 207, 823 Utah 
Adv. 5, 385 P.3d 708, 2016 Utah App. LEXIS 217 (Utah Ct. App. 2016).
Where an inmate sought relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Remedies Act alleging, among other things, denial 
of his right to effective assistance of counsel, district court properly determined that because an order nunc pro tunc 
was no longer available as a remedy, the inmate’s relief should be sought by a direct appeal; the inmate’s untimely 
filing could be excused. Johnson v. State, 2006 UT 21, 549 Utah Adv. 3, 134 P.3d 1133, 2006 Utah LEXIS 49 (Utah 
2006).
As shown in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-102(1)(a), the legislature expressly stated that the rules of civil procedure will 
govern proceedings in PCRA claims. Although the statute provides that procedural requirements to PCRA petitions 
are found in Utah R. Civ. P. 65C, this line cannot be read in isolation. When both provisions are read together, it 
appears the legislature intended PCRA claims to be governed by all of the rules of civil procedure and that a court 
should make procedural departures from the rules only when expressly called for in rule 65C. Because rule 65C 
does not explicitly address new claims in amended petitions filed after the one-year statute of limitations, other rules 
of civil procedure, including Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c), should be used to fill in the gaps. State v. Noor, 2019 UT 3, 2019 
Utah LEXIS 3 (Utah 2019).
Constitutional protections.
Post-conviction proceeding is ultimately civil in nature and does not implicate the same constitutional protections as 
do criminal prosecutions; a district court may dismiss a petition for failure to prosecute.  Finlayson v. State, 2015 UT 
App 31, 345 P.3d 1266, 2015 Utah App. LEXIS 53 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. denied, 362 P.3d 1256, 2015 Utah LEXIS 
237 (Utah 2015).
Exhaustion of remedies.
Dismissal of a petition for relief under this chapter was proper because appellant failed to seek a trial de novo in the 
district court after his convictions in a justice court. The fact that defendant was not represented by counsel for two 
years after the entry of the sentence or that he sought relief after the period for seeking a trial de novo had expired 
did not rise to the level of unusual circumstances warranting post-conviction relief. Peterson v. Kennard, 2007 UT 
App 26, 570 Utah Adv. 62, 156 P.3d 834, 2007 Utah App. LEXIS 21 (Utah Ct. App. 2007), aff'd on other grounds, 
2008 UT 90, 620 Utah Adv. 46, 201 P.3d 956, 2008 Utah LEXIS 203 (Utah 2008).
Petitioner's Postconviction Relief Act claim was not barred for failure to exhaust legal remedies simply because he 
failed to file a direct appeal. Valenzuela-Lozoya v. West Valley City, 2015 UT App 122, 786 Utah Adv. 25, 350 P.3d 
244, 2015 Utah App. LEXIS 124 (Utah Ct. App. 2015).
Relief inappropriate.
By confining its analysis to whether the justice court had strictly complied with the rule, the district court 
unnecessarily curtailed its inquiry into whether petitioner's plea was knowing and voluntary, a determination that 
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had to take into account not only the rule compliance but all the surrounding facts and circumstances of the plea; 
because the district court applied the wrong legal standard, its grant of postconviction relief was inappropriate. 
Valenzuela-Lozoya v. West Valley City, 2015 UT App 122, 786 Utah Adv. 25, 350 P.3d 244, 2015 Utah App. LEXIS 
124 (Utah Ct. App. 2015).
Timeliness.
Because the language of the PCRA, case law, and the amendments to the PCRA and Utah R. Civ. P. 65C 
supported the district court’s application of Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c) in the instant case, the district court correctly 
concluded that it did not have discretion to review petitioner’s claims in his amended petition unless the claims 
related back to the claims in the original petition under rule 15(c). State v. Noor, 2019 UT 3, 2019 Utah LEXIS 3 
(Utah 2019).
Cited in
Hutchings v. State, 2003 UT 52, 84 P.3d 1150, 2003 Utah LEXIS 130 (Utah 2003); Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 
42, 94 P.3d 263, 2004 Utah LEXIS 109 (Utah 2004); Bluemel v. State, 2007 UT 90, 173 P.3d 842, 2007 Utah 
LEXIS 194 (Utah 2007); Logue v. Court of Appeals, 2016 UT 44, 824 Utah Adv. 30, 387 P.3d 976, 2016 Utah 
LEXIS 124 (Utah 2016).
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